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FRONT COVER: Arlelgh Burke Means Destroyer! - Arlelgh Burke (DDG 
1 
51) slides down the ways at Bath Iron Works, Maine. The lead ship of 
the Aegis guided missile destroyer class Is named after ADM Arlelgh 
A. "31-Knot" Burke. With a 59-foot beam, the DDG 51's short broad 
hull gives her optimum sea-keeping, mobility, speed and stability In 
heavy seas. Mrs. Roberta Burke, ADM Burke's wife, Is the ship's spon• 
sor. Photo courtesy of BIW. See page 2. 
BACK INSIDE COVER: Arlelgh Burke Means Destroyer! - ADM Arlelgh 
A. "31-Knot" Burke, the heroic World War II destr'oyerman and Naval 
tactician and unprecedented three-time CNO, awaits the launching of 
his namesake - Arlelgh Burke (DDG 51). ADM Burke Is the first living 
Individual to have a class of ship named after him. Photo by JOCS(SW) 
James R. Giusti. See page 2. 
1 BACK COVER: Arlalgh Burke Means Destroyer! - DDG 51 's Crest. See 
page 32 for explanation. 
By CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Jr 
Sometimes by living long enough 
a venerable leader acquires a repu-
tation that is larger than life. With 
ADM Arleigh A. Burke that's not 
possible. He is just what we now 
think he was, great in war and 
peace, forceful, decisive, thorough 
in planning, bold in action, ima-
ginative, a careful Hstener, an ir-
resistible communicator. Jf one 
goes back and reads the commen-
tary of his contemporaries - (his-
torian) S.E. Morison who saw him 
in action, (ADM's) Halsey and 
Mitscher whom he served, all the 
journalists on scene in the Pacific, 
his peers, and those who served 
him - there is never a gray cloud 
of doubt, no shadow of reservation, 
just unstinting admiration. 
After the war Burke was in the 
tight band who in 1949 fought off 
Air Force domination in "the re-
CAPT Wayne Hughes, Jr., USN 
(Ret) is the author of recently pub-
lished " Fleet Tactics: Theory and 
Practice," the universally highly 
recommended treatment of this es-
sential subject. CAPT Hughes is an 
adjunct professor at Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey. 
' 
volt of the admirals.'' He was 
picked from well down in the Rear 
Adm'irals list and made CNO in 
1955, with so far as I know, scarce-
ly a whin,per of protest from his 
former seniors. He served six 
years until 1961, during the hey-
day of the Navy's operational 
success in keeping the peace 
around the world. One of his 
great achievements was to blend 
(ADM] Raborn 's missile technol-
ogy with (ADM) Rickover's nuclear 
propulsion to achieve a fleet of 
Polaris submarines in so short a 
time as to be scarcely imaginable 
today. 
But it is Burke as tactical com-
mander that LT Mark Phillips 
writes about. When then CDR 
Burke arrived in the South Pacific 
in February 1943, we had fought 
five night battles around Guadal-
canal with results that varied be-
tween mediocre and disastrous. All 
this time we had a radar advantage 
which let us surprise the Japanese 
repeatedly with little or no show 
for it. What was the problem? It 
was that we were using line tactics 
designed for long range daylight 
gunnery duels. At night and at 
short range, the torpedo was the 
killing weapon. 
You see this when you consider 
that o column, optimized to bring 
all guns to bear, presented about 
100 yards of hull for every 600 
yards or so of column. The Japa-
nese could see our gunfire and 
could hardly fail to place their tor-
pedoes somewhere between the 
endpoints. They had a one-in-six 
chance of hitting with every 
"fish. " When they put 40 in our 
general direction, they could ex-
pect six or seven hits, and the rec-
ord shows that they got them. If we 
had exposed our beams only for 
the short time it took to launch tor-
pedoes, we would have halved our 
gunpower but reduced our vulner-
ability by a factor of ten, which is 
roughly the length-to-beam ratio of 
a destroyer or cruiser. We forgot 
that combat is force against force. 
The ideal you seek is not maxi-
mum delivery of ordnance alone 
but maximum delivery on target 
over a ship's time in combat. 
That is what Burke saw. Nimitz 
had emphasized training as the 
key, but what tactics to train to? 
While he worked up his DESRON 
22 (DESRON 23 was later) he 
thought about tactics. Here was his 
assessment: Actions will be at 
night; during the day airpower 
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CAPT Burke's flagship, Charles Ausburne (DD 570), In ac• 
tlon. Painting by CAPT Gerard Richardson. 
rules the waves. Night means ac• 
tion at close quarters. In fact, for 
our destroyers the closer the better 
because the torpedo is the decisive 
weapon; theirs is better than ours, 
but ours is good enough if we use 
radar to hit first and they can't hit 
back. When the war started we 
foolishly took torpedoes off our 
cruisers. Therefore destroyers, not 
cruisers are our decisive weapon in 
these night actions: "ten" fish on 
2100 tons are worth more than 
nine 8" guns on 10,000 tons. With 
radar we have surprise, so let's ex-
ploit it. Divide our force for ma• 
neuverability, but do it so that all 
elements support each other. Hit 
the enemy first with one arm (us-
ing torpedoes of course, and no 
gunfire to warn him). Then hit him 
with the other aim from an unex• 
pected direction while he's reeling 
from our first punch. Change direc• 
lion to mess up his torpedo solu• 
!ions, and never show him a beam 
aspect. If we work it right, our ra• 
dar and surprise are worth more 
than his more powerful, more nu-
merous torpedoes. 
Now Jet LT Phillips carry on the 
story of what happened - before 
Burke arrived, and after. 
By LT Mark Phillips 
When then CAPT Arlelgh A. Burke led DESRON 23 into battle as its commo• dore, he put into action a battle plan known as the "Doctrine of Faith." By 
employing Burke's faith doctrine the ships of his 
squadron 23, nicknamed the Little Beavers, exalted the 
name "destroyer" during combat action in World War 
II. Their success in a series of operations against Japa• 
nese naval forces and shore installations played a large 
part in the winning of the Solomon Islands. 
It was as commodore of DESDIV 43 that CAPT Burke 
had laid the ground work for his doctrine which rec• 
ommended new tactics for the employment of destroy• 
ers operating with cruiser task forces. With American 
and Japanese forces repeatedly locking horns in waters 
surrounding the Solomons, CAPT Burke saw these 
changes as a subject of tactical immediacy. 
Tassafaronga and Savo Island 
Two sea battles during the war impacted greatly on 
CAPT Burke's thipking and played an important part 
In the way he was to fight his destroyers. Those were 
the Battle at Savo Island on 9 August 1942 and the Bat• 
tie of Tassafaronga ("Night of the Long Lances") on 30 
November 1942. 
The Battle of Savo Island was a surprise night attack 
by an eight-ship Japanese task force which defeated a 
confused 15-shlp Allied task group screening Savo 
Island. When the battle was over, four heavy cruisers: 
USS Astoria (CA 34), USS Quincy (CA 39}, USS Vin• 
cennes (CA 44} and the Australian HMAS Canberra 
had been lost and over 1500 sailors had perished. 
There were no reported Japanese casualties. 
At Tassafaronga, Guadalcanal Island, a resolute and 
skillful Japanese force consisting of eight destroyers 
and aided by their fast and deadly torpedo, nicknamed 
the Long Lance, administered a tactical defeat to an 11· 
ship U.S. task group (six DD's and five CL's}. Al• 
though the battle prevented the Japanese from execut• 
ing a major reinforcement of their troops on Guadal• 
canal, one heavy cruiser was sunk, USS Northampton 
(CL 26), three heavy cruisers were knocked out of the 
war for a year, and more than 400 sailors were killed. 
CAPT Burke, who understood the value of time in bat-
tle, concluded that one reason for the losses was a cau-
tious task force commander who, for four fatal minutes 
after contact with the enemy, withheld permission for 
his destroyers to launch torpedoes. A favorite saying of 
CAPT Burke was "The difference between a good offl• 
cer end a bad officer is about 10 seconds." 
Therefore, when CAPT Burke wrote his doctrine on 
destroyer operations with cruiser task groups, be ended 
it with: 
"When contact with en enemy force is made destroy• 
ers in the van should initiate a coordinated torpedo 
attack WITHOUT ORDERS, ... This last recommend&· 
tion Is the most difficult. The delegation of authority ls 
always hard and ... where such delegation of authori• 
ty may result in disastrous consequences if a subordi-
nate commander makes an error, it requires more than 
that which is usually meant by confidence: IT RE· 
QUIRES FAITH." 
Esprit de DESRON 
Commodore Burke's aggressive battle plan covered 
all aspects of what the squadron was expected to do in 
a fire fight. Under non-battle orders he wrote "none." 
More than 400 World War II "Tin Can" sailors and aurvlv-
lng members of ADM Burke's DESRON 23 - the "Little 
Beavers" were among the crowd that saluted him at Iha 
launchlng. Photo by JOCS(SW) James R. Giusti. 
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